We use a range of dictator game experiments to investigate why people avoid information. Dictators in our experiment know their own payos and can choose whether to learn the payos of the recipient. We vary whether dictators can learn the recipient's payo before or after they are presented with their self-interested action. We nd that dictators are more likely to avoid information when they do not yet know their self-interested action, and consequently act more selshly in this case. These results go against two popular explanations of information avoidance: self-image and default eects. We study and test alternative explanations such as wishful thinking, cognitive dissonance, and attention and nd support for the latter. (JEL codes: C91, D64, D83, D01) 
Introduction
Information avoidance is widespread and leads to reduced responsibility in settings such as corruption (Dana 2006; Simon 2005) , the spread of disease (Sullivan et al. 2004 ), environmental pollution (Rayner 2012) , and even atrocities (Cohen 2001 ). For instance, in corporate scandals, ranging from Bernie Mado 's Ponzi scheme to corruption at FIFA (the international governing body of soccer), it is dicult to imagine how so many people could have failed to notice the unethical behavior (Bazerman and Sezer 2016) .
More structured evidence of information avoidance in a social context comes from the eld of experimental economics. Participants in experiments on social preferences frequently sacrice some of their own monetary gains when they know this action will help an anonymous recipient. But when given the choice to obtain the information about the consequences of their actions, they opt to avoid the information and choose the self-interested action (e.g., Dana et al. 2007; Ehrich and Irwin 2005) . This information avoidance behavior is inconsistent with other-regarding distributional preferences.
Following the seminal experiment in Dana et al. (2007) (hereafter, DWK) most of the studies related to information avoidance in such pro-social settings associate the main reason behind information avoidance with self-image (described below). However, various motives can explain the information avoidance behavior:
Self-image. People are not necessarily inherently altruistic, yet they like to appear so, not only to others but also to themselves (Dana et al. 2007 ; Grossman and van der Weele 2017. See also Broberg et al. 2007 ; Dana et al. 2006; Lazear et al. 2012 ).
Default eect. People avoid information since there is a psychological cost for changing the default of not receiving information (Grossman 2014; Larson and Capra 2009). Wishful thinking: People may use information avoidance to wishfully believe that their self-interested action is not so likely to have adverse consequences for others. Thus, their perceived probability of the adverse consequences of their self-interested actions is less than the actual probability, which leads to a higher expected payo when avoiding the information instead of revealing the information. (Feiler 2014 based on Rabin 1995 . See Brunnermeier et al. 2004 for the theoretical model of wishful thinking, and see Sharot 2011). Attention. People are more myopic and concerned with the initial information that they see, which is the information regarding their own payo, and are thus less concerned with respect to the payo of others (Golman and Loewenstein 2016; Karlsson et al. 2009; Taso and Madarasz 2009). Cognitive dissonance. People dislike being exposed to information that might conict with their existing beliefs. Participants may decide to choose the self-interested action when they are informed about it initially. Thus, they dislike receiving information that might conict with their existing information (Matthey and Regner 2011; Konow 2000; Akerlof and Dickens 1982 for the theoretical model of cognitive dissonance).
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Empirical evidence of information avoidance has been extensively studied in the literature. However, while these studied are useful in providing evidence of information avoidance, they are less so when it comes to distinguishing motives behind this avoidance. The objective of this paper is to do precisely this: to put dierent motives to a test. To this end, we develop a model that combines these motives and we test predictions of motives with an experiment. Specically, the two following questions help us to distinguish between dierent motives:
1. Are people strategic in information avoidance?
Does the level of uncertainty impact information avoidance?
We test dierent motives for information avoidance by using and slightly modifying the hidden-information dictator game of DWK. The hidden-information dictator game is a two-player game in which a dictator has a binary choice between two actions where one of them leads to a higher payo than the other, but the consequences for the recipient are unknown. There are two possibleand equally likelystates of the world. In the conicting case, the self-interested action leads to a lower payo for the recipient, and in the non-conicting case to a higher payo. All the dictators need to do is click a button in order to nd out if the case is conicting or non-conicting. DWK demonstrate that many dictators avoid the information and, as a result, the share of dictators who choose the self-interested action is signicantly higher than in the baseline dictator game with full information.
To answer question 1, we modify the hidden-information dictator game by swapping the order of learning the self-interested action and the choice of whether to obtain information about the recipient's payo or not. The dictator knows her own payos initially and has a chance to avoid information about the recipient payo in both treatments. The fundamental experimental manipulation changes the decision-making timeline. In the original setting of DWK, the dictator is told about her self-interested action before she is presented with the information choice (the Before treatment). In contrast to this timeline, in the other setting she is told about her self-interested action after she has been presented with the information choice (the After treatment). Table 1 displays the summary of the predictions of each motive. The self-image motive predicts that both the Before and After treatments will have the same rate of information avoidance. The reason is that the relevant information and the strategy set in both treatments are the same: the dictator initially knows her 1 Although cognitive dissonance starting from Festinger (1957) covers a broad range of behavior which can include self-image as well, here we focus on the stated denition. See Abelson et al. (1968) for a wide-ranging volume taking stock of research on Festinger's theory. payos and can remain ignorant about the recipient's payo in both treatments.
Therefore, she can protect her self-image by avoiding the information in both treatments. The default eect motive has the same predictions since in both treatments the default option is to avoid the information.
However, if either wishful thinking, attention, or cognitive dissonance are factors behind information avoidance, we should expect a dierence between the Before and After treatments. For these three motives, prior knowledge of the self-interested action in the Before treatment makes the information avoidance choice more attractive than in the After treatment. This leads to lower rates of information avoidance and selsh choices in the After treatment than in the Before treatment. A wishful thinking dictator may underestimate the probability of the conicting game and choose to avoid information. Underestimating the probability of the conicting game increases the expected payo of a wishful thinking dictator with other-regarding preferences. In this way, wishful thinking in information avoidance leads to a higher expected utility than obtaining information on the actual recipient's payo with no wishful thinking.
A dictator may pay more attention to the initial information. She may focus more on her prior information about her self-interested action in the Before treatment and she may focus more on the prior information about the recipient's payo in the After treatment. She is then more likely to avoid the information on the recipient's payo in the Before treatment than in the After treatment.
A dictator with cognitive dissonance avoidance might not be keen to obtain the information that may conict with her existing belief. Prior knowledge of the self-interested action in the Before treatment may prompt the dictator to choose the self-interested action. She may then prefer not to obtain the information on the recipient's payo as this might conict with her decision.
Our rst hypothesis is that the rate of information avoidance and selsh choices do not dier signicantly in the Before and After treatments. If the self-image or default eect is a factor behind information avoidance, we should not expect the rst hypothesis to be rejected. If any of the remaining motives, wishful thinking, cognitive dissonance, or attention are factors behind information avoidance then we should expect a rejection of the rst hypothesis.
Our results indicate that the information avoidance choice only leads to a significant increase in selsh choices in the Before treatment (where dictators know about their self-interested action when deciding whether to obtain information or not). In the Before treatment dictators avoid the information in over 34% of cases and choose the selsh option in over 58% of cases, almost double the rates in the After treatment (where dictators decide whether to obtain information or not without knowing their self-interested action): 16% of information avoidance choice and 34% of selsh choices. The latter 34% of selsh choices in the After treatment do not signicantly dier from 29% in the dictator game with full information (the Conict treatment).
Question 2 exposes the role of the uncertainty of adverse consequences in information avoidance. To further test dierent motives behind information avoid-ance, the next experimental variation minimizes the uncertainty compared to 50% of cases with moral wiggle room, while still giving the chance for information avoidance. We replace the 50% probability of a conicting case in the original setting of DWK with two extremes: a Before treatment with a 99% probability of conicting payos (Conict-Before treatment) and a Before treatment with a 1% conicting payo probability (No-Conict-Before treatment).
As the probability of conicting payos increases, dierent motives vary in their predictions of the changes in the rate of information avoidance choices. The selfimage motive predicts the same rate of information avoidance for both ConictBefore and No-Conict-Before treatments. A dictator with self-image concern would like to not appear selsh, which is independent of changes in the underlying probabilities. The attention motive also predicts the same rate for both Conict-Before and No-Conict-Before treatments since it assumed to be entirely exogenous and do not depend on the probability of conicting payos.
The cognitive dissonance, on the other hand, foresees that the higher the probability of conicting payos, the higher the rate of information avoidance. As the probability of conicting payos increases, the chances that the dictator will face information that conicts with existing information increases. This leads to a higher rate of information avoidance in the Conict-Before treatment compare to the No-Conict-Before treatment.
The default-eect and wishful thinking motive predict a lower rate of information avoidance in the Conict-Before treatment compared to the No-ConictBefore treatment. As the probability of conict increases, the default costs decreases as the stakes become larger. Thus, the rate of information avoidance decreases. Wishful thinking, similarly, predicts that the higher the probability of conict, the lower the rate of information avoidance. As the probability of conicting payos increases, the expected cost of the required wishful thinking increases (as it becomes harder to turn a blind eye to the conict), which leads to a lower rate of information avoidance. Therefore, wishful thinking predicts a higher rate of information avoidance in the No-Conict-Before treatment than in the Conict-Before treatment.
Our second hypothesis is that there is no signicant dierence between the Conict-Before and No-Conict-Before treatments. If the self-image or attention is a factor behind information avoidance, we should not expect a rejection of the second hypothesis. If any of the remaining motives of default-eect, wishful thinking, or cognitive dissonance, are factors behind information avoidance, we should expect a rejection of the second hypothesis. We nd that as the level of uncertainty changes, the rate of information avoidance does not signicantly change, consistent with the attention and default effect model. For all probabilities of conicting payos of 1%, 50%, and 99%, the rate of information avoidance does not dier signicantly from approximately one-third (34%, 34%, and 38%, respectively).
We observe that the predictions of the attention motive is the closest to the ex- were told that the actual game they were playing was randomly selected with equal probability. The dictator could reveal which game was playing by clicking a Reveal button that did not entail any costs. Participants were informed that the dictator's decision as to whether to reveal would not be disclosed to the recipient. In the Before treatment, the dictator is presented with her self- that the probability of conicting payos was 1 percent instead of 50 percent.
Although we elicited participants' beliefs in treatments with extreme underlying probabilities, we did not do so in the Before and After treatments. Instead, we kept the design as close as possible to the moral wiggle room design of DWK for comparison reasons. In treatments with extreme underlying probabilities, however, we were only interested in information avoidance choices and these choices remained untouched by belief elicitation.
To maintain the possibility of subjects not knowing their self-interested action at the time of the information choice, we did the following. In the After treatment, dictators needed to click on a Continue button to choose information avoidance whereas in the Before treatment they did not need to click any button. However, Grossman (2014) found that such deviation does not produce signicantly dierent results along several key measures. model predicts a higher changes of information avoidance as the probability of conicting payos decreases than when it increases. Feiler (2014) looks at the low probability of conicting payos of 20 percent, but Grossman and van der Weele (2017) argue that the within-subject environment of Feiler (2014) with multiple periods deviates from the environment of the self-image model. We initially ran three sessions with a 25 percent probability of conict in a one-shot between-subjects setting and nd no signicant dierence. Next, we decided to look at the extreme case to provide a fair chance for both the self-image model and also wishful thinking.
Procedures
The experiment took place at the Experimental Laboratory at the Technical University of Berlin from July 2016 to August 2017. Randomization across the three treatments occurred at the participant level using ORSEE (Online Recruitment System for Economic Experiments; Greiner (2015) , which excludes those who had previously participated in an experiment related to charitable giving. The sessions were one-shot, between-subjects, gender balanced, with at least 16 participants present. Most of the participants were undergraduate and master's students from the Technical University of Berlin. The interface was programmed using the z-Tree software package (Fischbacher 2007) . Experimental instructions are provided in the Appendix.
Participants were instructed that they would be playing a game with another person in the room with whom they had been randomly and anonymously matched. Upon arriving at the experiment, participants sat at computer terminals, and the instructions were read aloud. After participants had been told which role they had been assigned, they were allowed to make a (for the recipients, hypothetical) choice. Unless otherwise noted, the screen progression and layout reproduced the DWK interface as faithfully as possible. The text of the general instructions was reproduced almost verbatim, as were the treatmentspecic instructions in the replication treatments.
Participants completed a brief quiz to make sure they understood the instructions. To be certain that participants fully understood that the Reveal button depicted both players' payos and that the Continue button only showed the own payo in the After treatment, the last two questions of the quiz focused on these two buttons. The quiz was administered just before the start of the experiment, so participants were unlikely to forget. The answer were read aloud; they were then asked whether they had any doubts or questions.
We conducted 33 sessions. A total of 736 students participated across the ve treatments with exactly half (368) playing the role of a dictator (Player X The agent might be uncertain about the consequences of her actions on the receiver and might want to distort her prior beliefs (wishful thinking). At the same time the agent might care about the signal she is sending via her action:
whether her action makes her look like a bad type or not (self-image). If the agent gets to see her payos rst, she might be conditioned to pay more attention to her payos than to the receiver's payos (attention). In addition, one of the actions is a default action and choosing any other action is associated with a cost (default eect).
The agent is endowed with level of altruism β distributed according to cdf F (β) on [0, 1] with a probability mass on zero F (β = 0) = ε. We call these β = 0 types homo economicus and assume complete rationality for them.
The agent faces a choice between two actions A and B. Before choosing between A and B the agent chooses whether to reveal or not the recipient's payos (these actions are denoted by R for reveal and N for do not reveal). We will denote the agent's strategy as σ, for example, σ N,X = (N, arg max {A,B} X) denotes that the agent rst does not reveal and then chooses the action that maximizes her own payo X, and σ R,Y = (R, arg max {A,B} Y ) denotes that the agent rst reveals and then chooses the action that maximizes the recipient's payo Y . The agent's type is her level of altruism denoted by β which is distributed according to cdf F (β) on [0, 1]
We assume that homo economicus type β = 0 does not have default eect and self-image concerns. We further assume that when she is indierent between revealing a costless information or not then with probability µ ∈ [0, 1] she will remain ignorant, and that µ is common knowledge.
The type's β utility under certainty is U β (σ) = X + (1 + a)βY − c w (w) − c s − c d , which has four components described below in detail:
Allocative utility X + βY , where X denotes the agent's payo and Y denotes the recipient's payo, Attention parameter a in (1 + a)β shifts the level of altruism β downwards;
Costs from wishful thinking c w the costs from distorting the subjective probability about the state of the world;
Self-image costs c s the costs from pooling with the bad type (homo economicus);
Default eect costs c d the costs of taking an action that is dierent from the default eect;
The allocative utility represents the standard distributional preferences as in Fehr and Schmidt (1999) and Bolton and Ockenfels (2000) . The attention parameter a ∈ [−1, 0] represents priming: if the agent is primed to be more selsh compared to the Conict setting then a < 0, if there is no priming then a = 0.
We assume that all types β are primed by the same treatment in the same way: for the Before treatments a < 0 (regardless the probability of conict p), for Conict and After treatments a = 0.
The costs from wishful thinking c w depend on both the prior probability p and the distortion w and are given by the expression c w = c 1 p log p p−w for w ≥ 0, where c 1 ∈ [0, 1] is a constant. (We only consider w ≥ 0 as only this will occur in the equilibrium; for w < 0 the costs can be specied symmetrically.)
This functional form is chosen to represent these costs due to several reasons described below.
First, at the boundaries the costs satisfy sensible conditions: for w = 0 (zero distortion) the costs are zero and for w = p (full distortion) the costs are innite.
4 Second, the marginal costs ∂cw ∂w also satisfy sensible conditions. First, the marginal costs are positive ( ∂cw ∂w > 0) and increasing ( ∂ 2 cw ∂w 2 > 0) and become innite when the distortion w approaches the prior p. Second, the marginal costs monotonically decrease in p: (
, which means that the costs of a 1% distortion are higher if the prior probability is low (e.g., distorting the probability from p = 5% to (p − w) = 4% is more expensive than distorting from p = 50% to (p − w) = 49%). Third, the marginal cost at zero distortion w = 0 for each prior p is the same and equals ∂cw ∂w | w=0 = c 1 . Thus, for each prior belief p it is equally costly to distort the belief by an innitesimal amount of wishful thinking and these costs are captured by a constant c 1 .
The self-image costs c s of an agent i represent how bad the signal that i sends is, by playing strategy σ i . We assume that the image costs are proportional to (1) σ0=σi dF the mass of homo economicus agents that play the same strategy σ 0 = σ i and also to (2) σ =σ0 dF the mass of agents that play strategies σ dierent from what any homo economicus would play σ = σ 0 . The reason behind assuming (1) is clear: the more homo economicus agents there are pooling with i, the worse the inference about i's type is. The reason behind assuming (2) is similar: the more agents there are that succeed in separating from the homo economicus agents (unlike agent i), again the worse the inference is about i's type, since her pooling with homo economicus becomes a more extreme type of behavior. For example, if all homo economicus agents play the same strategy as i does, while all other agents play a dierent strategy, then the image costs are maximal. Formally, we assume that c s is proportional to a product of (1) and (2): c s (σ i ) = s σ0=σi dF · σ =σ0 dF , where s > 0 is a non-negative constant.
The default eect costs c d are the costs of choosing the option alternative to the default eect: not to reveal the information.
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In the Before setting the timing is as follows: t=0, the agent observes β, a, F, X, {Y , Y }, p, c d , c c and functions c w , c s , and simultaneously chooses either to reveal Y or not, and, in the latter case, also chooses the amount of wishful thinking w, t=1, agents that revealed at t=0 observe Y and choose A or B; agents that did not reveal choose A or B based on the distorted probability p − w.
Equilibrium Now we show the existence of semi-separating equilibrium in which there is a threshold value β 1 that prescribes the strategy for each type: types below this threshold choose not to reveal (some of them will not engage in wishful thinking for it is too costly, for others their amount of wishful thinking will be increasing in their type) and choose option A, types above the threshold choose to reveal and, in case they discover conicting payos, choose option B. Proposition 1. There exists a symmetric equilibrium in pure strategies σ * (β) characterized by a cuto β 1 (such that 0 < β 1 ≤ 1): all types β ∈ (0, β 1 ) choose σ * (β) = σ N,X ≡ (N, w * (β), A) with w * (β) ≥ 0 monotonically increasing in β, all types β ∈ (β 1 , 1] choose σ * (β) = σ R,Y ≡ (R, arg max {A,B} Y ). The cuto equals
The proofs of this and further propositions are presented in subsection 6.2 of the Appendix.
The equilibrium σ * might not be unique since the game of minimizing the image costs c s has a nature of coordination (or self-fullling equilibrium) and the agents might decide to coordinate on a dierent strategy. Specically, if each agent with β > 0 that chooses action A expects that all other such agents will reveal (and thus pool with (1 − µ) of the homo economicus agents), then this might be an equilibrium. Indeed, in this case deviating from R to N causes a shift in image costs (since nobody with β > 0 pools with µ of homo economicus agents) that might outweigh the benets of sticking with the default eect (−c d ) and benets of wishful thinking.
5 Alternatively, if as in Grossman (2014) , the default eect would be to reveal, then the default eect costs denote the costs from not-revealing.
Yet, this can occur only in case no agent including the most altruistic reveals and in conicting case chooses B, otherwise the equilibrium described above is generally unique.
Remark. If the most altruistic type β = 1chooses to reveal, then Proposition 1 denes the unique equilibrium.
Next, we determine the agent's behavior in the Conict and After settings. For both settings we assume no priming and thus the attention shift disappears:
In the After setting the timing is as follows:
t=0, the agent observes β, F, {X, X}, {Y , Y }, p and the function c s , and simultaneously chooses either to reveal Y or not and, t=1, the agent observes X; agents that revealed at t=0 observe Y and chooses A or B; agents that did not reveal choose A or B based on the prior probability.
Proposition 2. In the After setting the agent's strategy is determined by her type β:
Next, proposition determines the agent's behavior in the Conict setting.
Proposition 3. In the dictator game with a complete information setting the strategy of the agent is determined by her type β:
where Next we formulate the predictions regarding the role of the timing of revelation choice in Before and After by comparing the thresholds β 1 and β 2 .
Only two factors attention and wishful thinking predict that β 1 > β 2 , while self-image and default eect predict β 1 = β 2 . Prediction 1.1 If dominant, the attention and wishful thinking motives predict that in the After treatment the share of revealing subjects and the share of altruistic choices is higher than in the Before treatment.
However, the self-image and default eect motives being dominant predict that the share of revealing subjects and the share of altruistic choices in the After treatment is the same as in the Before treatment.
Finally, we formulate the model predictions regarding the behavior in the After and Conict treatments as a result of Proposition 2 and Proposition 3. Attention and wishful thinking predict that the behavior in these treatments is the same β 2 = β 0 , while the self-image and default eect predict that in After the behavior is more selsh: β 2 > β 0 . Attention and self-image predict that the probability of conicting payos does not play a role. Wishful thinking and default eect predict that as the probability of conicting payos p increases, the threshold β 1 (p) decreases. 6 Prediction 2.1 If dominant, the wishful thinking and default eect motives predict that in the Conict-Before treatment the share of revealing subjects is the same as in the No-Conict-Before treatment.
If, however, the attention and self-image motives were dominant, then the share of revealing subjects is predicted to be higher in the Conict-Before treatment than in the No-Conict-Before treatment. Hence, the increased selsh choices due to moral wiggle room found by DWK and replicated in the Before treatment depends on whether participants know their self-interested action. Relative to the Conict treatment, the rate of selsh choices in the After treatment changes slightly, from 29% to 33%. The information avoidance choice only leads to a signicant increase in selsh choices when it is presented after the announcement of the self-interested action.
Experimental Results
Observation 2. As the probability of conicting payos increases, the rate of information avoidance does not change signicantly; it remains at approximately one-third. The rate of dictators choosing information avoidance is 38% (25 out of 66) in the Conict-Before. In the No-Conict-Before treatment, the rate is 34% (27 out of 77), which does not dier signicantly [χ
The rate of information avoidance choices in the Before treatment is 34% (30 out of 88). This rate does not dier signicantly from the rates in both the result suggests that the probability of conicting payos does not impact the information avoidance behavior.
Hence, we observe that the predictions of the attention model are the closest to the results of the experiment. This result suggests that DWK's avoid information result may be driven not be self-image but rather by the attention motive.
Instead of strategically trying to protect self-image, they may be naively reacting to any relevant information that grabs their attention. Put dierently, even if self-image concerns play a role for information avoidance, they can be neutralized by making the situation more complex. Subjects are not strategic in the protection of their self-image.
Conclusion
In the present experiments, we allow for the possibility of information avoidance but vary the probability of conict and the timeline of knowing the selfinterested action so that we can compare dierent model predictions. We are thus able to provide a test of the robustness of the moral wiggle room eect. It turns out that self-image does not seem to explain the manipulability of behavior in the dictator game.
Our paper has an implication for the design of information structures for cases with a conict of interest. In various real-life situations, informed experts make a suggestion to uninformed customers. This is, for example, the case for highly specialized experts like doctors, nancial advisers, head-hunters, and lawyers.
When making this binding choice on behalf of the customer, the expert faces several incentives, which are not necessarily aligned: the benet to the customer (the quality or tness of the product) and the benet to the expert (commission paid for a specic product compared to other products). As in our setting, the information about the quality of the product and the attached commission can be initially hidden and revealed by the expert (e.g., for a doctor prescribing a drug, both her patient's diagnosis and the drug producer's incentive program might be relevant and initially unknown). Our results suggest that if the information about the commission is revealed rst, then it might have a detrimental eect on the expert's incentives to learn the information on the quality of the product and, as a consequence, may lead to some poor advice.
With free access to information, the order of receiving the information plays a 
Instructions

All treatments
This is an experiment in the economics of decision-making. You will be paid for your participation in the experiment. The exact amount you will be paid will depend on your and/or others' decisions. Your payment will consist of the amount you accumulate plus a B C5 participation bonus. You will be paid privately in cash at the conclusion of the experiment. If you have a question during the experiment, raise your hand and an experimenter will assist you.
Please do not talk, exclaim, or try to communicate with other participants during the experiment. Please put away all outside materials (such as book bags, notebooks, etc.) before starting the experiment. Participants who violate the rules will be asked to leave the experiment and will not be paid.
In this experiment, each of you will play a game with one other person in the room. Before playing, we will randomly match people into pairs. The grouping will be anonymous, meaning that no one will ever know which person in the room they have played with. Each of you will be randomly assigned a role in this game. Your role will be player X or player Y. This role will also be kept anonymous. The dierence between these roles will be described below. Thus, exactly one half of you will be a Player X and one half a Player Y. Also, each of you will be in a pair that includes exactly one of each of these types. The game your pair will play will be like the one pictured below. Player X will choose one The actual game you will play will be one of the two pictured below. However, we will not publicly reveal which game you are actually playing. Before playing, Player X can choose to nd out which game is being played, if they want to do so, by clicking a button. This choice will be anonymous, thus Player Y will not know if X knows which game is being played. Player X is not required to nd out and may choose not to do so. When the game ends, we will pay each player privately. You do not know which of the games you will be playing. The actual game you will play was determined by two coin ips (one for TOP vs BOTTOM, and one for LEFT vs. RIGHT) before the experiment. However, we will not reveal publicly which game you are actually playing.
Before playing, Player X can choose to nd out which games from LEFT and RIGHT are being played, if they want to do so, by clicking a Reveal Player Y's Payo button. Note that for Player X, the payments will be identical.
The only thing that will dier are the payments for Player Y. This choice will be anonymous; thus Player Y will not know if X knows which game is being played. Player X is not required to nd out and may choose not to do so by clicking on the Continue button. After deciding to reveal or not, Player X will be informed which game(s) from TOP and BOTTOM is being played. This is independent of his or her actions. When the game ends, we will pay each player where w * denotes the optimal level of wishful thinking.
The RHS of the equation represents the costs from choosing σ R,Y , these costs are constant for any type β. The LHS of the equation represents the costs from choosing σ N,X and we need to show that these costs monotonically increase in β. If this is the case, then for any type β that chooses σ N,X , each type β < β will also choose this strategy. We need to show the following:
∂[(p − w * )((1 + a)β∆Y + c s ) + pc w (w * )] ∂β > 0.
(6.5)
. Let us nd the optimal level of wishful thinking w * for each type β ∈ (0, β 1 ).
From the rst order condition ∂EU (σ N,X ) ∂w = 0 we get w * = p(1 − c 1 p (1 + a)β∆Y + c s ). Therefore σ * is an equilibrium.
Next, we nd the cutoβ 1 by plugging w * > 0 from equation 6.6 into equation 6.4. We get:
c 1 p 2 + c 1 p 2 log (1 + a)β∆Y + c s pc 1 = p(∆X + c c ) + c d .
(6.7)
7 Notice that cs is a function of the thresholdβ 1 and not of the type β and thus the derivative ∂cs ∂β = 0.
From the denition of c s , using equation 6.1 and the fact thatβ 1 is the cuto we get that c s = sµε 1 β1 dF . For simplicity, assume a linear cdf for β > 0: F (β) = ε + β(1 − ε) and thus: c s = sµε(1 − ε)(1 − β). Proof. Given the arguments used in the previous proof, the result is immediate.
Since the agent does not distort the prior probability of conicting payos in the After treatment, we get the following condition for the agent with β > 0 to be indierent between playing σ N,X and σ R,Y : EU (σ N,X ) = EU (σ R,Y ) ⇐⇒ X + βY − pβ∆Y = X + βY − p∆X which gives us equation 3.2. Agents with β = 0 will choose the X-maximizing strategy and randomize w.r.t. the revelation choice.
Proof of Proposition 3.
Proof. Following the arguments in the proofs above, the result is immediate.
The threshold value β 0 is determined by equating the utility of action A (allocative utility minus the self-image costs) and the utility from action B: U (A) = U (B) ⇐⇒ X + βY − sε(1 − ε)(1 − β) = X + βY , which gives the equation 3.3.
